BLOCKCHAINS FOR PAY-PER-USE BUSINESS MODELS: INSIGHTS FROM A DESIGN RESEARCH STUDY by Beverungen, Daniel et al.
Blockchains for Pay-per-use Business Models of Industrial Equipment:
Insights From a Design Research Study




A blockchain features an immutable, encrypted, and
distributed ledger that enables transactions even if
trust and trusted intermediaries are absent. Despite
research on their technological properties, few papers
are on record to demonstrate (a) what business
scenarios blockchains can enable and (b) under which
circumstances they outperform rival technologies. This
shortfall of design knowledge obscures blockchains’
value proposition, its conceptual limitations, and
its positioning towards rival classes of IT artifacts.
We set out to design a blockchain-based IS that
enables pay-per-use business models for industrial
equipment—a business model that suffers from high
transaction costs and complex agency dilemma caused
by asymmetric information. We demonstrate how smart
contracts deployed in a blockchain can level these
information asymmetries. However, we also find that
blockchains will only outperform rival technologies if
the business scenario fulfils a set of specific properties,
narrowing down the scope of application scenarios for
applying blockchains substantially.
1. Introduction
Blockchains are presented as a game-changing
technology that might enable trusted transactions in
situations in which other means to establish trust fail
[1]. Based on foundational concepts that emerged in
the early 1990s [2], blockchain gained popularity as
an ”electronic payment system based on cryptographic
proof instead of trust” [3, p. 1]. Cryptographic proof
refers to the technical irreversibility of the transactions
documented in a blockchain, which de-emphasizes
the importance of establishing trust in other parties,
a foundational assumption for traditional payment
systems [3]. The irreversibility of transactions is
guaranteed by a distributed ledger, in which transactions
are stored immutably and which is maintained by
a peer-to-peer network [1, 4, 5]. Apart from its
technical core, blockchains can feature more elaborate
business logics by establishing smart contracts [6,
p. 9ff]—self-executing programs deployed to the
blockchain to steer transactions [1, 7, 6, p. 9ff]. With
smart contracts, complex transactions can be designed
and applications other than payment systems can be
developed, paving the way for using blockchains in
diverse networked business scenarios [7, 8, 6, p. 9ff].
Inspired by the IS discipline’s focus on applying
technology for serving organizational and societal goals,
current research on blockchains focuses on identifying
platform features and use cases in which they can be
applied [9, 5]. Advances have been made towards
explaining what value blockchain technology can render
to improve information systems [10] and what types of
blockchains might fit different use cases best [11, 12].
However, the discipline still lacks compelling evidence
to identify (a) in what business scenarios blockchains
can be applied to enable trust-free transactions [9,
10], and (b) in which of these scenarios blockchains
outperforms traditional classes of information systems
substantially enough to offset the costs of organizational
transformations for shifting to this technology. Research
needs to provide compelling answers, to identify
blockchains’ decisive advantages and limitations.
Approaching both research directions inductively,
we set out to explore if blockchain technology can
enable pay-per-use business models for industrial
equipment—a context that has been insufficiently
explored for its potential to apply blockchains, even if
it seems to fit the properties of the technology rather
well. We find that smart contracts can remedy some
of the information asymmetries that limit establishing
pay-per-use business models in industrial business
scenarios. However, the design process also raised
led us to identify some profound challenges related to
designing blockchains that require further investigation.
The paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we reflect
on the properties of blockchains and on information
asymmetries in pay-per-use business scenarios. In
Section 3, we describe and justify our research





approach. In Section 4, we report on the design,
implementation, deployment, and evaluation of smart
contracts. In Section 5, we identify seven insights into
the advantages and drawbacks of blockchains compared
to rival technologies. We derive five properties
that business scenarios must display to accommodate
blockchains. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. Related Research
2.1. Core Features of Blockchains
We explored the body of knowledge on blockchain
technology in Information Systems research by
conducting a systematic literature review in September
2019. We queried the AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
for papers on ”Blockchain”. We categorized the
resulting 124 hits by their type of publication, research
method, targeted industry, type of technology, and their
consideration of blockchain technology. 34 publications
reported on qualitative studies, 27 conducted design
science research, 24 applied conceptual research
approaches, and eight were quantitative studies.
Blockchains evolved from a technology for
transferring electronic coins to platforms that enable
fully programmable transaction processing based on
smart contracts [9, 4, 6, p. 9ff]. Blockchains are based
on four principles: With a transaction, an electronic
coin can be send (partly) from one address to another
one; public-private-key encryption is used to authorize
transactions; transactions are validated and added
to a central ledger, subject to distributed consensus
mechanisms; and the ledger is stored block-wise in a
decentralized network acting as a distributed timestamp
server to make the ledger tamper-proof [3, 4].
Every block contains a limited amount of
transactions published by miners—also called
nodes—to the blockchain network. Miners are
rewarded with a transaction fee paid by senders for
every transaction that is recognized in a new block
[3]. The fee depends on the desired execution time,
the amount and fees of other transactions, and the
conversion rate between crypto-currency and real-world
currencies [3].
Since the introduction of smart
contracts—programmable sets of rules for transaction
processing—into what is known as Blockchain 2.0,
complex interactions can be supported in a way
that requires a minimum of trust among the parties
interacting. [4, 6, p. 17]. Smart contracts help
to “formalize and secure relationships over public
networks” [13]. They execute autonomously, are
self-sufficient in their allocation of resources and assets,
and execute in a decentralized ecosystem [6, p. 16].
While the technology has matured, the third generation
of blockchains focuses on the technology’s application
in different industries and ecosystems [9, 4, 6, p. 27].
Blockchain 3.0 refers to applications that either focus
on other domains than the financial sector [8, 6, p. 53]
or provide interfaces to other information systems [7].
Current research on blockchains focuses on
applications in finance and logistics, while few
implementations target the public sector [14, 15, 16] or
health care [17, 18]. Financial applications focus on
initial coin offering, a blockchain-based crowd-sourcing
concept [10]. Logistics applications aim at improving
transparency, providing trust, or simplifying and
accelerating processes for the inter-organizational
and inter–national flow of information or documents
[7, 19]. However, many interactions in supply chains
still require physical trust and integrating technologies
proves complex, while convincing incentives to use
blockchains are still missing [8].
Blockchains seem best suited for scenarios in which
multiple parties are involved, trust is absent, and
relying on an intermediary is not an option [11, 12].
Different types of blockchains can be instantiated [5],
depending on the desired permissions, data access,
investment-weighting for transaction consensus, chain
modularity, scalability, interoperability, centralization
of regulation, and anonymity. Two types frequently
discussed include public blockchains and private
blockchains, in which access to data is restricted [12, 5].
While it is a myth that blockchains can offer
transactions that are entirely free of trust, they might
enable scenarios that were impractical to implement
due to trust issues before [20, 6, p. 17]. Blockchains
substitute interpersonal trust with cryptographic
proof, so as to enable trust-free transactions [1, 3].
Interpersonal trust is “the willingness of a party [trustor]
to be vulnerable to the actions of another [trustee]
based on the expectation [trusting beliefs] that the
other party will perform a particular action important
to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or
control the other party [trustee]” [21, p. 712]. Whereas
from a mathematical perspective interpersonal trust
can be replaced with cryptographic proof, from a
socio-technical perspective, interpersonal trust rather
shifts towards trust in technology [20, 22]. Trust in
technology depends on “the willingness of a trustor
to behaviorally depend on a piece of software to do a
task“[23, 24, p. 330, p. 2]. Thus, blockchains’ disruptive
potential is disputed: While some envision them to
make interpersonal trust obsolete, others content that
they replace personal with artificial trustees [25, 26].
Blockchains are argued to allow implementing new
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organizational forms. For instance, decentralized
autonomous organizations (DAOs) enable automated
and transparent self-organization by building on the
governance mechanisms and decision processes defined
in smart contracts [27, 28]. DAOs can act autonomously
without the need to establish a central authority.
2.2. Pay-Per-Use Business Models for
Industrial Equipment
Dating back to the Total Care business model
invented by the aircraft engine company RollsRoyce
in 2003 [29], pay-per-use (or: power-by-the-hour)
business models have been accumulating attention.
With this business model, aircraft operators rent
engines based on their hours of operation. This
business model can make costs more predictable
for customers and increases the engines’ availability
and predictability, while it expedites maintenance
processes and yields substantial cost savings [29]. For
service providers, advantages include economic factors
(additional revenues with after-sales services), demand
conditions (satisfying more complex customer demands
with bundled solutions), and competitive advantage
(services are more difficult to imitate by competitors)
[30, 29]. Due to their potential benefits, pay-per-use
business models might be applied successfully for other
”capital goods including computing, cranes, trains and
aerospace”[31, 29, p. 987].
However, establishing pay-per-use business models
is challenging [32]. Economic theory explains why
business relationships that involve specific assets require
monitoring the other party, contractual agreements,
appropriate incentives, and/or high amounts of trust
among the actors involved [33, 34]. A service provider
can only keep an equipment available if informed on the
equipment’s usage and condition. With principal-agent
theory, new institutional economics outlines that a
principal (i.e., a service provider), who is unable to
monitor an agent’s (i.e., a service customer’s) actions
is subject to negative effects, including moral hazard,
hold-up, or adverse selection [33]. Customers might use
an equipment in inappropriate ways that might cause
damage to the product, while providers would need
to put the equipment back into operation. Preventing
these adverse effects requires leveling information
asymmetries. The agent might, for instance, signal
that use of the equipment is consistent with agreed-on
specifications. This signal can be send by providing data
detailed enough to allow providers to monitor and assess
their equipment’s condition at all times. Trust has been
argued to (partially) substitute the need to supervise an
agent’s actions.
Anecdotal evidence and case studies [35] illustrate
why a complete record of an equipment’s condition
data often cannot be established and analyzed, while
stakeholders often do not trust each other enough to
offset the limitations caused by asymmetric information.
Amongst others, service customers often do not want
external parties to monitor the usage and condition data
of their machines [35], for instance, to prevent business
analysts to evaluate their stocks based on the data
obtained from their machines. Due to this limitation,
we currently lack a class of information systems that
levels asymmetric information among service providers
and service customers appropriately.
Blockchains might be the information systems
to satisfy the feature set required for establishing
pay-per-use business models in an industrial scenario.
From a technological perspective, establishing the
technology in this scenario might be a convincing
business cases that blockchain enthusiasts have long
been searching for to demonstrate the applicability and
superiority of blockchains.
Pay-per-use business models satisfies all items on
a checklist for estimating a use case’s aptitude for
blockchain technology [12]: They assume that data on
a machine’s condition is shared in a common database
by service providers and service customers (multiple
parties involved), while the parties potentially have
conflicting interests and trust issues. The parties want
to avoid a trusted third party, since they strive to
protect their knowledge about complex assets (service
providers) and the assets’ use and condition (service
customers). The parties are subject to different rules of
access to data, while the structure of the rules governing
the transactions—once established—will remain largely
unchanged along an equipment’s life-cycle. There is a
need for an objective immutable log that documents how
an equipment is used, as advocated by product life-cycle
data management [36, p. 2]. While there mostly is no
need for making access to data public, consensus needs
to be determined inter-organizationally—provided
that service providers and service consumers are
different legal entities—pointing at designing a
private blockchain. In contrast, we assume that
establishing a conventional enterprise system will fit
the requirements of intra-organizational scenarios better
than a blockchain.
3. Research Method
Design science research is on a dual mission,
focusing on both designing IT artifacts that provide
utility to solve real-world problems, and contributing
innovative theory to the discipline’s knowledge base
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[37, 38]. Against this backdrop, we set out to design
components of a blockchain-based application system
that can remedy information asymmetries that impede
pay-per-use business models.
More specifically, we designed smart contracts and
deployed them into the Ethereum blockchain’s testnet.
First, the contracts retrieve hours of operation of an
equipment from a service customer’s ERP system,
which is crucial for a service provider to monitor
and bill the use of an equipment. Second, the
contracts document maintenance activities performed
on the machine by a service provider, while they also
document an audit trail of aggregated data on customer’s
use of the machine. Therefore, the contracts assure
that both parties fulfil their obligations to use and
maintain a machine appropriately. With the smart
contracts, the blockchain connects the ERP systems of
service providers and service customers, acting as an
inter-organizational system.
We evaluated the smart contracts conceptually, to
identify their suitability to remedy typical information
asymmetries that inhibit pay-per-use business model in
industrial settings. Like in other design research projects
on blockchains [1, 15], we remained unable to apply
and evaluate the IT artifact in a naturalistic setting,
since to do so requires making substantial investments
in IT infrastructure and application design. Still, our
endeavor enabled us to generate substantial insights
on verification times and transaction costs associated
with deploying and executing smart contracts in the
Ethereum blockchain. We condense these results by
providing seven insights and five properties that govern
the suitability of blockchains vis-á-vis rival technologies
used in inter-organizational settings.
4. IT Artifact
4.1. Pay-per-use of Industrial Equipment
In our scenario, a manufacturer provides industrial
equipment (machines) to an industrial service customer.
Besides their benefits, pay-per-use services can
result in asymmetric information, hidden action and
moral hazard [33, 30]. The service provider depends
on the service customer reporting correct data that
is required for billing the machine’s use. Also,
the provider requires service customers to use the
equipment within defined parameters. Vice versa, the
service customer depends on the service provider to bill
machine hours correctly and to guarantee the machine’s
availability.
While establishing trusted intermediaries can level
information asymmetry, monitoring a machine is both
complex and costly [11]. Also, sharing usage
data of machines with third parties contradicts data
confidentiality requirements on the service customer’s
side, because external parties could estimate capacities
and production parameters based on analyzing these
data. A private blockchain can be used to counter
these issues of public blockchains by limiting the data
accessibility to selected third parties. This study uses
the public Ethereum blockchain to test our IT artifacts’
technical feasibility.
Blockchain technology’s properties—replacing the
need for trust and intermediaries by proofing data
integrity and authenticity—might help to overcome the
information asymmetries by storing data transparently
in a tamper-proof and authentic record [5]. To do
so, data are sent to the blockchain and verified by the
network’s consensus mechanisms [3]. In verification,
one miner is entitled to select the transactions (based on
solving a computational puzzle) that may form the next
data block, before the network decides about accepting
the block and rewarding the miner [3].
4.2. Conceptual Design of a Smart Contract
We designed a two-phase process to enable
pay-per-use business models with a blockchain (Figure
1). First, the service provider and the service customer
agree on the terms and conditions for supplying/using
the industrial equipment on a pay-per-use basis. Just
like in a traditional contract, this agreement might
include pre-specified service levels, usage details or
billing process. Process 1 prepares the execution of
the blockchain-based pay-per-use process. The service
provider initializes the contract with all relevant terms
and conditions and deploys it to the blockchain. Once
deployed, the service customer—and all parties that are
registered in the smart contract as participants of the
business case—can read and verify the contract. After
initializing, deploying, and verifying the smart contract,
the pay-per-use process is ready to be executed.
For executing the pay-per-use contract itself, we
conceptualize the processes 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. In 2.1,
all data required for billing the service are tracked
and posted to the blockchain, subject to data privacy
restrictions. These data are collected, pre-processed,
and provided to the blockchain from conventional
enterprise systems, such as the service customer’s
ERP system. Once the data have been verified by
the blockchain network’s consensus algorithms, they
become tamper-proof and provide a single point of truth.
From now on, payments are triggered by the smart
contract autonomously. Also, payments can be made






























































































































































Start Event End Event Activity Sequence Flow Message Flow
Figure 1. Pay-per-use processes supported by the smart contract
Process 2.2 deals with abnormalities in the usage
behaviour. The service provider is subject to customers
using an equipment in non-specified or unintended
ways. While the service provider must ensure the
availability of the machines, the machine must log
anomalies and post this log to the blockchain in a
tamper-proof audit trail.
Process 2.3 monitors the equipment’s condition
data and maintenance status. If the equipment is
not maintained properly, the customer might face
production down-times, probably causing substantial
financial damage. Therefore, the service provider must
ensure that pre-specified service levels are complied
with by performing maintenance activities. However,
the service provider might remain unable to initiate
maintenance processes if the machine’s condition data
are unavailable. The other way round, the service
customer might lack detailed data about the machine
and its maintenance status. To level this bi-directional
information asymmetry, the current machine status as
well as maintenance processes must be documented in
the smart contract.
4.3. Implementation, Deployment, and
Evaluation
In our implementation, we used smart contracts
and the blockchain as an inter-organizational system,
networking the ERP systems of the service provider and
service customer (Figure 2). The industrial equipment
is traced by the service customer’s ERP system. Both
the service customer’s and the service provider’s ERP
systems are equipped with a public key, that is also
used as address, and a private key. To connect each
ERP system to the respective address, we developed a
continuously running middleware written in JavaScript
and executed in the Truffe Suite,1 a development
environment for Ethereum’s smart contracts that uses
the web3.js library.2 The transaction logic is written in
Solidity, an object-oriented and high-level programming
language for smart contracts.3
For initiating the smart contract, the provider must
initialize the contract and deploy it from its ERP system
into the blockchain. Afterwards, the customer confirms
the deployed smart contract4.
function sendUsage(uint256 operatingHours)
public payable {





Listing 1. Smart contract for making payments
For executing the pay-per-use billing process, the
machine sends its usage data to the customer’s ERP
system. The customer’s ERP system uses our
middleware to transmit the relevant usage data to
the blockchain, by issuing an transaction including
the usage data to the smart contract. Our design
prescribes that the payment for using the equipment
is transferred within this transaction, using Ethereum’s
1Project site: https://www.trufflesuite.com/ last
accessed 28.01.2020.
2Project site: https://github.com/ethereum/web3.
js/ last accessed 28.01.2020.
3Project site: https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/
v0.6.1/ last accessed 28.01.2020.
































Figure 2. Component model of the implemented software prototype
crypto-currency Ether. The smart contract then redirects
the payment to the service provider (Listing 1).
To document maintenance activities, the smart
contract keeps track of an equipment’s status and
triggers corrective actions on the provider’s site. When
concluding maintenance, the service provider issues
documents that are send to the blockchain and verified
by the customer (Listing 2). The misuse identification
process can be implemented similarly. Once an anomaly
concerning the use of a machine is detected, the process
is triggered to create and transmit a misuse report which
is stored in the smart contract. The misuse is then







Listing 2. Extract from a maintenance log
To analyze the time elapsed between posting a
transaction by our middleware and its publication in
the blockchain’s distributed ledger, we examined the
performance of Ethereum’s test network Ropsten. New
data can be added to Ethereum’s ledger only by sending
a new transaction. Ethereum is designed to add a
new block in an average of 12 seconds. However, the
amount of new transactions can exceed this limitation
and, therefore, transaction fees are used to prioritize
transaction processing. In our test, we discovered that
30 minutes passed before a transaction with a fee of
1 Gwei ($0.01; exchange rate $/ETH from 6th August
2019) was added to Ropsten’s ledger, while it only
took about 30 seconds until a transaction with a fee of
8 Gwei ($0.08) was mined. While the data retrieved
from our test might not correspond one-on-one with
the Ethereum network itself, our test indicated that
processing transactions on short notice might be subject
to considerable fees.
5. Discussion
The processes introduced in Section 4.2 level
information asymmetries among principals and agents
with a digital machine record, resolving agency
dilemma in pay-per-use business models for industrial
equipment. The implemented software prototype builds
on deploying smart contracts to Ethereum, a public
blockchain that can store data in an immutable way.
While we demonstrated how the smart contracts
we deployed to the Ethereum blockchain resolve
the common information asymmetries present in
pay-per-use business models, it is debatable under
which circumstances smart contracts deployed to a
blockchain can outperform rival IT artifacts that can
provide similar functionalities. In order to explore the
decisive advantages and disadvantages of blockchains
for a pay-per-use scenario, we reflect on the advantages
and drawbacks of four classes of IT artifacts that could
be used towards this end.
Apart from our prototype that builds on a public
blockchain (Option 1), a private blockchain could have
been used to host the same smart contracts, leveraging
data confidentiality at the expense of immutability
(Option 2). Further, the service provider could host
the machine record on its ERP system, providing
the required functionality to the other actors involved
(Option 3). Finally, a trusted third party could act as
a neutral intermediary, providing a platform to network
the other actors (Option 4). Our assessment of all four
options is summarized in Table 1.
5.1. Insights derived from our implementation
Blockchains’ basic property is that data are stored
immutably due to applying distributed consensus
mechanisms [5, 39]. Once committed, transactions and
smart contracts cannot be altered, as long as the network
is large enough to prevent single entities from taking
over control. Then, the ledger in both public and private
blockchains is immutable [11].
Insight 1: Blockchains are superior to rival IT artifacts
in terms of providing an irreversible audit trail, e.g., for
a machine’s use and maintenance history.
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Category Public blockchain Private blockchain Trusted party Trusted third party
(our implementation) (Service Provider) (intermediary)
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Table 1. Comparison of IT artifacts for implementing a digital machine record
New actors can participate in a blockchain at
will (public blockchain) or by invitation (private
blockchain), subject to making small specific
investments. New smart contracts can be deployed
with minimal effort, reducing the need for complex
contracting to be performed outside the system
[40]. Middleware technologies can be used to solve
integration problems between applications, including
Ethereum and many ERP systems. Connecting
additional actors with proprietary application systems
often requires that considerable specific investments
be made. Thus, blockchains fit well with scenarios in
which interactions involve many different participants
and in which specific investments and a priori
transaction costs need to be avoided as far as possible.
Insight 2: Blockchains are superior to rival IT artifacts
in highly networked business scenarios that involve
changing transaction partners, since they eliminate the
need for making specific investments and allocating a
priori transaction costs.
Once committed, a transaction cannot be altered by
any single actor. Likewise, a smart contract deployed to
a blockchain is trustless, executes autonomously, and is
self-sufficient. This immutability prevents actors from
inflicting others with moral hazard, since data cannot
be altered to create benefits or disadvantages [41, 42].
Traditional systems that provide a boundary object that
is controlled by a single actor put less powerful actors at
the jeopardy of hold-up [43, 44].
Insight 3: Blockchains disempower single actors,
leveraging equal control of the data stored and the
application logic executed. Once deployed, contracts
execute autonomously, reducing the risk of hold-up and
ex post transaction costs on the principal’s side.
A blockchain’s immutable transaction log
provides data integrity as a build-in functionality
that traditional database management systems (DBMS)
lack. Furthermore, private key signatures are used to
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assure a sender’s authenticity. While both technologies
are not implemented by many traditional DBMS
by default, they could be extended to feature this
functionality.
Insight 4: While blockchains come with particular
functionality, rival IT artifacts can be extended to
implement similar levels of security and authenticity.
While all four artifacts depend on data that are
correct, providing authentic data [11, 45] is particularly
crucial to realize benefits with a blockchain. In our
scenario, smart contracts deployed to a blockchain
correctly execute a pay-per-use process, whereas flawed
data would lead to processing false payments. Inputting
false data on purpose are a problem of moral hazard in
all four classes of systems.
Insight 5: Blockchains particularly rely on the
authenticity of data provided by other applications.
Public blockchains allow public access of their
data, enabling anyone to track the actions performed
by all participants. Even if actors use pseudonyms,
there is no guarantee that they will remain covert,
but they could be identified and be associated with
their transactions even after considerable time. Private
blockchains restrict access to blockchains to predefined
users [46, 40, 47], increasing the confidentiality of their
data. However, using a blockchain presupposes that
data can be shared with others, limiting blockchains to
data that are de-contextualized and non-critical to the
survival of an organization.
Insight 6: Rival IT artifacts outperform blockchains
(particular public blockchains) in terms of data
confidentiality and privacy.
While blockchains display high latency to verifying
transactions—limited to committing a few transactions
per second and taking minutes to hours to confirm
a transaction—rival IT artifacts can be designed to
process thousands of transactions per second [44].
Blockchains’ latency is due to using distributed
consensus mechanisms, requiring the majority of nodes
to accept a transaction before committing it to the
network [47, 46]. The larger the data volume
transmitted, the more time (or money) is needed to
confirm a transaction, following an exponential function
[48]. The costs for processing transactions on a
blockchain, therefore, exceed the costs caused by rival
IT artifacts considerably [49].
Insight 7: Rival IT artifacts outperform blockchains
in terms of transaction processing speed, marginal
transaction fees, and data volume, limiting blockchains
to scenarios that involve very small volumes of data and
transactions that tolerate latency.
5.2. Properties of business scenarios that
accommodate blockchains
Based on our insights, we conclude that business
scenarios must feature five properties to render
blockchains superior to rival classes of IT artifacts. Most
importantly, the business scenarios must benefit from
the immutable ledger of transactions implemented on a
blockchain
Property 1: 1. The irreversibility of the transaction
data and/or smart contracts is crucial. The underlying
business logic is relatively stable, making historic data
valuable.
Data provided on a blockchain are shared with outsiders
or even with the general public.
Property 2: Confidentiality of the data is not crucial,
or other means can be established to protect data from
analysis and interpretation by outsiders.
Compared to rival artifacts (e.g., ERP systems),
blockchains are inferior in terms of transaction costs
and processing speed. Furthermore, rival IT artifacts
might evolve to feature some properties possessed by
blockchains. We conclude that business transactions
that are mediated by blockchains must feature high asset
specificity to compensate their inferior transaction costs
and processing speed.
Property 3: Transactions display high asset specificity,
low frequency, and high uncertainty, and involve many
participants. They require small amounts of data to
be processed, tolerate latency, and provide value that
is higher than the transaction fees for mining the
transaction.
Blockchains disempower single parties in terms of data
ownership or control, providing a network of actors as a
decentralized actor. Furthermore, blockchains are open
towards including new participants or tolerating actors
leaving the network.
Property 4: The business scenario is subject to
new actors entering the network or actors leaving
the network. Actors strive to avoid data ownership
exercised by any single actor, to relieve their risk of
hold-up.
Once deployed, smart contracts execute autonomously
and cannot be stopped or changed by any single party.
This continuity reduces the need to monitor transactions,
lowering ex post transaction costs. On the other hand,
the rules governing transactions must be fairly stable, to
reduce the need to update smart contracts frequently.
Property 5: Actors strive to avoid ex post transaction
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costs for monitoring the transactions performed by other
actors, relieving their risk of moral hazard, while rules
that govern transactions are fairly stable.
6. Conclusion
Blockchains present themselves as a game-changing
technology that can facilitate interactions in scenarios
that could not be facilitated with other information
systems. One such case is establishing pay-per-use
business models for industrial equipment, a case that
requires the parties involved to exchange business data
to avoid asymmetric information, hidden actions, and
moral hazard. However, the trade-off for blockchains
competitive advantage in resolving agency dilemmas
are technical disadvantages regarding transaction
processing speed, throughput, costs and confidentiality.
We reason that blockchain’s ideal business scenarios
depend on highly authentic data with low confidentiality,
requires transaction with high asset specificity and can
not trust any single (third) party to control data or
execute transactions.
We implemented a smart contract that can remedy
some of the information asymmetries inherent to
pay-per-use business models. On the more general level
of blockchain technology’s applicability and decisive
advantages, our project enabled us to present new
insights on designing, implementing, deploying, and
operating smart contracts in Ethereum. We argue
that this knowledge is urgently required to demystify
blockchains’ applicability, rather than jumping on the
blockchain bandwagon lightly. Further research is
required to elicit prospects, limitations, and business
scenarios for this technology.
7. Acknowledgment
The research leading to these results received
funding from the Ministry of Economics,
Innovation, Digitalization and Energy, State of
North Rhine-Westphalia, as part of the cluster of
excellence it’s OWL (project Digital Business, funding
no. 005-1807-0106).
References
[1] R. Beck, J. Stenum Czepluch, N. Lollike, and S. Malone,
“Blockchain – the gateway to trust-free cryptographic
transactions,” in Proceedings of the 24th European
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